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1. INTRODUCTION
The current stage of the Czech economy (in 1996) is often characterized as "post-
privatization". It is generally believed that the major package of privatization measures
has been completed and now what matters most is the efficiency with which:
• the new owners control privatized companies, and
• new investments and investors enter the economy.
In this respect, the role of so-called investment privatization funds ("IPF") has been
broadly analyzed.1 Are the IPFs the vehicle of corporate governance proper? To what
extent can IPFs be intermediaries for  new capital in  a country like the Czech Republic?
The role of IPFs in restructuring the economy  is the focus of this paper.
This study begins with a summary of the initial intentions of the authors of the
privatization project.
2. HISTORY AND LEGAL FRAME
2.1 Exclusivity
In 1990 two ideas regarding privatization emerged almost simultaneously in the
Czech Republic2:
• to a large degree privatization will be implemented as a free distribution of
property, and
• specifically designed IPFs will be an integral part of such a mass privatization.
                                      
1 See the extensive list of titles attached to this paper.
2 We are using "Czech Republic“ for the period of time when the country still was "Czechoslovakia“,
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The two concepts were legislatively approved in February 1991 by the Large-Scale
Privatization Act.
Many other approaches were proposed in 1990-1991. Within the realm of voucher-
type schemes, one extreme did not include IPFs at all and the other had IPFs as its major
vehicle.
It is the thesis of this paper that the Czech-style voucher privatization plan did not
necessarily require IPFs as an ingredient. In 1990 the first of the above extremes was
seriously considered as an option. The second extreme, however, was never viewed as
acceptable in the Czech Republic and, consequently, IPFs were never conceived of as a
essential condition of the voucher  privatization plan.
The Large-Scale Privatization Act reflects this policy. It permits the participation of
IPFs but does not specify in detail their function.
2.2 Universality
In principal, once admitted to the privatization process, IPFs could participate in any
one of the privatization techniques (direct sales, public tenders, small-scale privatization,
public flotation, etc.). However, the Large-Scale Privatization Act created a solution that
prohibits the IPFs from techniques of privatization other  than  that of  voucher
privatization.
Only later, after the completion of the two privatization waves, did the Investment
Companies and Investment Funds Act make it possible for IPFs to invest in other types of
property.
2.3 The legal form
Some six months after the Large-Scale Privatization Act (September 1991), the
federal government issued a decree that provided some details concerning voucher
privatization and all of the relevant agents participating in it, including IPFs.WORKING PAPER                                                                           WORKING PAPER                                                                          
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It may be worth mentioning that at that time the Joint-Stock Company Act was
practically the only piece of legislation regulating business in the Czech Republic, and
the joint-stock company was the only legal form of a commercial company. More precise
and extended definitions of commercial companies were introduced into the legal
framework only by the new Commercial Code, which was effective as of January 1992.
The concepts of an investment company and unit funds (mutual funds and investment
trusts) arose even later.
The IPF was, therefore, conceptualized as a "standard" joint-stock company, except
that it needed to accumulate investment vouchers for its license and consequently bid for
shares in the privatized companies.
With the completion of each wave, the IPF issued its own shares and distributed
them proportionally among its voucher-holders, thus turning them into shareholders.
2.4 Necessity
The problem may be separated into the following two questions:
a) Is it necessary to establish at least one IPF in order to start the voucher
privatization wave?, and
b) Is it possible to continue with voucher privatization if the IPFs are totally ignored
by voucher-holders?
The answer to (a) is surprisingly complex. It is important for the interpretation of the
present role of the IPFs that the Large-Scale Privatization Act gave voucher-holders the
right to use the services of IPFs as intermediaries. Strictly speaking, then, the
government should not have been allowed to open the privatization wave had  no IPFs
been established. Fortunately, this never became a problem because several hundred
IPFs were established and took part in the process.
Question  (b) is even more important for the interpretation of the functions of IPFs.
The Large-Scale Privatization Act gave no regulations for terminating the process if noWORKING PAPER                                                                           WORKING PAPER                                                                          
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IPFs were established. In this sense the IPFs did not constitute a  necessary part of the
scheme.
In summary, the scheme allowed for two theoretical extremes to emerge:
• only one IPF is established and in this IPF are concentrated all investment
vouchers, and
• no voucher-holders take the opportunity to use the services of the IPFs that have
been established.
In actuality, the IPFs played an exceptionally significant role in both waves. The
degree of their significance, however, was not pre-determined by the law or the
government but was generated by the free choice of voucher-holders.
3. LICENSING
3.1 Problems of liberalism
In the Czech Republic the actual emergence of IPFs has taken place under
conditions that can be described as "liberal in the extreme.". It is no exaggeration to
stress that in practice the entry of an IPF resembled registration rather than genuine
licensing.
For the government it was very important that the IPFs were established
spontaneously. In the Czech Republic, unlike in other post-Communist countries, it was
not the government that initiated the creation of privatization intermediaries. It was
generally agreed that the government should remain totally inactive, neither initiating
private intermediaries nor establishing its own IPF.
The philosophy driving the process was that it is private initiative that deserves
support because it is this initiative that requires rehabilitation. The risks generated by the
approach are obvious because private initiative may not emerge at the right time or in theWORKING PAPER                                                                           WORKING PAPER                                                                          
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right form but rather as a behavior generally perceived of as perverse, both economically
and socially.
However, these fears proved to be unjustified.
The Czech experience indicates that, as a rule,  government should not rely on its
own capacity and organizational ability. Rather, its effort should be fully devoted to
opening wide the possibility for all (sometimes unimaginable) types of privately based
efforts. In this,  government must be ready to take the above-described risks.
3.2 Requirements
The government may adopt two entirely different policies for issuing licenses to
IPFs. It may:
• view IPFs as a standard "collective investment undertaking" and apply to them
"classical" licensing procedures, or
• convert licensing into mere registration.
For post-Communist countries there is nothing in between. The Czech Republic
opted for the latter approach. It is the thesis of this paper that this was an explicit
interpretation of IPFs as sui generis vehicles of privatization, rather than standard,
Western-style collective investment undertakings.
Many times later on this policy was forgotten and at least partly abandoned. In
1991, however, the policy was still alive. In its spirit the government never imposed any
numerus clausus on the total number of IPFs and set such "soft" criteria for the licensing
body (first the Ministry of Privatization and later the Ministry of Finance) that practically
anybody could meet them.3
                                      
3 The specific, almost revolutionary circumstances of that time were expressed not only in the
contents of the criteria but also their form, e.g., in 1991, the licensing rules were formulated as an internal
instruction of the Ministry of Privatization and made public through newspapers and other media.WORKING PAPER                                                                           WORKING PAPER                                                                          
               THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT FUNDS                THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT FUNDS
_______________________________________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________________________
________CZECH MANAGEMENT CENTER                                                         ________CZECH MANAGEMENT CENTER                                                        
                                                         page                                                           page 9 9
However non-standard this approach may appear, in practice it proved to be
extremely efficient and legally correct.
3.3 Results of liberalism
Establishing an IPF was attractive to many not only because of the simplicity of the
above-described requirements but also from the point of view of the ease of regulating its
on-going behavior. As noted already, at the time when the IPFs were established almost
no such regulation existed.
Therefore, the overall liberalism of the government economic policy of that time
went hand in hand with its legal liberalism. Save for the above regulatory provisions, only
a few minor additional regulations could be found elsewhere in the then-existing legal
framework.
The positive effects of the  overall liberalism proved to be an appropriate policy for
that time, and its positive impact can now be seen in the consequent development of the
IPFs.
After two years, none of the many concerns raised at that time against the liberalism
of IPF regulation has been confirmed. The warnings that none or too many IPFs would be
established were all unfounded. Altogether 429 IPFs were established and successfully
participated in the first privatization wave. Of the total, 264 operated in the Czech
Republic and 165 in the Slovak Republic.
4. POST-PRIVATIZATION DEVELOPMENT
4.1 Attacks on IPFs
In spring 1992, shortly after the IPFs were established and started advertising,
Parliament launched a strong debate about their regulation. The heated discussion was
reflected in legislation that emerged, which changed somewhat the general conception of
the already-established IPFs.WORKING PAPER                                                                           WORKING PAPER                                                                          
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The most visible outcomes were that:
• civil servants were no longer allowed to be active on boards and supervisory
councils of IPFs, and
• the portfolio structure of IPFs became subject to regulation.
The latter restriction, at least, was economically unwise.4
4.2 Collective investment
The confusion initiated by this political intervention materialized in the newly
adopted Investment Companies and Investment Funds Act (No. 248/1992) in May 1992
(immediately before the bidding process in privatization rounds started).
This law, in contradiction to the original policy, legalizes the changes both to the
status of the IPFs and to their founder-managers. The official goal of these changes is to
introduce "rules of the  game" similar to those of countries with developed capital
markets.
The voices stressing that the "game" of privatization is substantially distinct from
that of a collective investment were far too weak. Thus, the major elements of the
regulation were the following:
a) A distinction between an investment fund and an investment company was
introduced. The existing IPFs was declared to be investment funds. Their
founder-managers were declared to be investment companies.
b) In addition to investment funds, unit funds (open and closed) were introduced.
c) Both the IPFs and their founder-managers have been prohibited from engaging in
activities other than those strictly reserved for investment companies and
investment funds.
                                      
4 Its political motivation is still to be discovered and is beyond the scope of this paper.WORKING PAPER                                                                           WORKING PAPER                                                                          
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d) The original vaguely defined licensing procedure for both the IPFs and
investment companies was replaced by one that is more elaborate and stricter.
The licensing authority was  moved from the Ministry of Privatization to the
Ministry of Finance. The new rules are based on the law itself, but the Ministry of
Finance has been authorized to impose additional requirements according to
need within the framework of the licensing proceedings.
e) A truly broad band of rules dealing with the protection of the investor was
defined. In this context, rules dealing with limiting and spreading risk (rules also
relevant to buying shares in voucher privatization) are important. Not insignificant
are  rules relating to the duty to inform, limiting the participation of some persons
on boards and supervisory councils of IPFs and investment companies,  etc.
f) In addition, IPFs and their founder-managers must have their own depository.
In spite of the legislative changes, the liberal approach of the government to IPFs
was basically preserved throughout the two privatization waves and became even more
liberal in some instances.
4.3 Participation
Apparently the advertising campaigns of the IPFs played a significant role in
inducing a large portion of the population to participate. In 1991, the Federal Ministry of
Finance registered some 8.54 million voucher-holders, 75 percent of the 11,319,138 adult
citizens who were entitled to register.5
Of the 8.54 million voucher-holders,  6,310,433 handed over their points (all or part)
to IPFs. In total the IPFs acquired 6,135,495,500 points,  almost 72 percent of the total.6
                                      
5 7,615,874 in the Czech Republic and 3,703,264 in the Slovak Republic
6 Out of this, IPFs founded in the Czech Republic acquired 72.5 percent and IPFs in the Slovak
Republic 27.5 percent.WORKING PAPER                                                                           WORKING PAPER                                                                          
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4.4 Bidding
In order to understand the true nature of IPFs, the technique of privatization is
important. The first wave of voucher privatization (May 1992-January 1993) consisted of
five consecutive bidding rounds. Simultaneously almost 1,500 companies (shares) were
offered. A pricing mechanism was created to adjust the values of auctioned shares to the
revealed ratios of supply and demand.
After the final round, IPFs ended with 66 percent of the shares offered and of this,
the ten largest IPFs controlled one-third.
This outcome is in line with the results of the so-called pre-round, where out of the
total of 8.5 billion investment points (or 8.5 million participants) some 6 billion investment
points were entrusted to IPFs.
Among the largest funds holding the largest amounts of investment points in the
Czech Republic were:
• Five funds established by already-existing domestic financial institutions (Ceská
Sporitelna, Komercní Banka, Iinvesticní Banka, Zivnostenská Banka and Ceská
Pojistovna),
• One fund established by a subsidiary of a foreign financial institution
(Creditanstalt),
• Three funds  established by companies created by private agents for this special
purpose (HC&C, YSE and PPF).
As already mentioned, the Investment Companies and Investment Funds Act
redefined requirements for the limitation and diversification of risk. The legislation
stipulated the following criteria:
1) An IPF cannot buy more than 20 percent of the shares of an individual company;
2) the shares of an individual company cannot constitute more than 10 percent of
the total value assets of one IPF;WORKING PAPER                                                                           WORKING PAPER                                                                          
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3) IPFs established by the same founder cannot buy more than 20 percent of the
shares of a single company;
4) shares of an individual company cannot constitute more than 20 percent of the
total assets of all funds established by  the same person.
To obtain the optimal portfolio, individual IPFs selected different strategies. In
general, however, the funds tried to obtain shares of enterprises in traditional sectors,
sectors whose export potential was perceived to be the best. This applied primarily to
companies in the processing industry and in the trade and service sectors. Harvard
Investment Funds, which had the third-highest amount of investment points (third only to
the funds of Ceská sporitelna and Investicní banka), narrowly concentrated its portfolio on
approximately 50 joint-stock companies, its goal being to gain a significant amount of
influence as a shareholder in these companies. The majority of other large IPFs,
however, invested their points in a wider spectrum of enterprises.
After the completion of five privatization rounds, it was discovered that the IPFs
ordered predominantly higher-priced shares, in contrast with the majority of individual
investors, which invested their points in cheaper shares.
4.5 Capital market emergence
The Securities Act was passed at the end of 1992. It focused on two major issues,
establishing the concept of full decertification and introducing into the legal framework
dealer-brokers and market organizers (The Prague Stock Exchange and RM-S Securities
Exchange).
The exchanges officially opened in March 1993 and the shares were effectively
transferred to individual voucher-holders and IPFs in May 1993.
The smooth and dynamic development of the Czech capital markets is closely
connected with the transformation process of the Czech economy, namely, with
completing large-scale privatization. In this respect, the success of privatization largely
depended on the behavior and prosperity of IPFs.WORKING PAPER                                                                           WORKING PAPER                                                                          
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Apart from them, banks (more than 50) and insurance companies (about 20) could
become potential investors. Concurrently, there are some five million individual
shareholders of both privatized joint-stock companies and IPFs.
Standard mechanisms working in developed market economies provide for perfect
or near-perfect mutual dependence of the real economy--i.e., the production of goods and
services--and the securities markets, especially markets for shares of joint-stock
companies. Falling share prices create pressure on the management of a joint-stock
company, and vice versa, the economic performance of the company is, sooner or later,
reflected in the prices of its stock. The present situation in the Czech Republic is
different. It still has to stress and encourage straight-forward activities of new the owners
in their enterprises.
4.6 Two types of behavior
In this respect, two major approaches of large institutional investors can be
observed.
First, some IPFs from the very start of the first wave have carefully developed a
strategy of getting as much control as possible over a large part of the economy and
insisted on active participation in the restructuring of "their" companies. Formally, this
approach is in accordance with the needs of a successful privatization process.
Secondly, one group of IPFs prefers to pursue short-term goals, stressing the
importance of quick gains. Each approach, especially in its extreme manifestation,
contains negative prospects for the successful development of the securities market and
privatization. In this respect there is a large area for  the application of the rights and
duties of state supervisory bodies, namely the Ministry of Finance.
The larger IFPs, especially, conform to strong control policies. Carefully worked out
portfolios of interconnected investments comprise both visible and  not-quite-so-visible
ties among many joint-stock companies controlled from one center. On the one hand
there are promises of higher efficiency under such control; on the other, efficiency isWORKING PAPER                                                                           WORKING PAPER                                                                          
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limited by the fact that the old, overmonopolized structures of the centrally planned
economy are preserved.
The phenomenon calls for very careful analysis, first by keeping in mind the positive
elements in such a development and its natural character. It is not easy--and finally not
even practical--to destroy the previous system in all its dimensions. In any case, for the
future there is much work to be done in fine-tuning the legislation and methods of work at
state supervisory institutions.
The second preference, stressing quick financial gains, endangers the dynamic
movement of the securities market towards stabilization, and in this manner it diminishes
the prospects for successful growth of many joint-stock companies. The behavior of many
investment funds can be explained by the fact that they need money to fulfill their
promises to shareholders  that were made before the start of the first wave.
The consequences of the short-term approach could be fatal, especially for its
proponents and initiators. Mass stock offers would result in enormous price decreases,
totally destabilizing the securities market. In pursuit of quick gains, the investment funds
would be compelled to sell their "best" stock and therefore to deprive themselves of a
considerable part of the assets they purchased in the first wave. The winners would
especially be large banks and perhaps foreign investors who would get an opportunity to
substantially improve their portfolios. In this way the position of controlled networks could
be strengthened.
We believe that this rather gloomy scenario will not prevail. Everything will depend
on the professional approach of all participants, especially the state supervisory bodies--
the Anti-Monopoly Ministry included. And we are still of the opinion that the optimal path
to a prosperous economy is concurrently to give individuals maximum possible
opportunities to use their initiative and master the act of proper regulation. With this dual
commitment  the second wave of voucher privatization is being prepared.WORKING PAPER                                                                           WORKING PAPER                                                                          
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4.7 Corporate governance
After the end of the first wave of privatization many funds--mainly smaller ones--
were forced to merge. More than forty investment funds have disappeared as a result.
Immediately after the end of the first wave, investment privatization funds began to
exercise their shareholder rights. The large funds appointed their representatives to the
boards of directors and supervisory boards of joint-stock companies.
These positions enabled the funds to actively influence the operation of the
companies, to participate in investment decisions, etc.
In the case of enterprises that were only partially privatized through vouchers, and
where the decision regarding the fate of the remaining shares had  not yet been made,
the government had to negotiate with the IPFs. It was immediately forced to deal with
IPFs as the rightful owners of significant interests in companies.
These negotiations are sometimes complicated because the funds are very much
aware of their position as owners of the given enterprise. In the event of a difference of
opinion between them and the government, these funds accept compromise solutions
only with the greatest reluctance.
5. THE PRESENT ROLE
5.1 The scope of the problem
The purpose of restructuring can be stated as the adaptation of companies to
changes in the environment. It should be noted that without environmental changes no
restructuring (adaptation) would be necessary because the companies (then the state-
owned enterprises) behaved optimally, given the centrally planned environment.
It is the thesis of this paper that after privatization the direct role of IPFs in this
restructuring (adaptation) is greatly overemphasized. The corresponding arguments
below are classified under the following titles :WORKING PAPER                                                                           WORKING PAPER                                                                          
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• categories of restructuring
• secondary restructuring of ownership
• spontaneous labor-shedding
• strength of green-field entrepreneurs
5.2 Categories of restructuring
5.2.1 Adaptation to a systemic change
In a post-Communist country like the Czech Republic, the scope and scale of
restructuring is not comparable to the meaning of this term in Western countries. The
spectrum of processes requiring adaptation reaches from the sudden disappearance of
traditional (COMECON) markets on the one hand to politically motivated purges within
management and government structures on the other.
Unlike Western countries, the nations in Central and Eastern Europe have quite
often gone through substantial changes in the overall system of their social, political and
economic life. Non-European readers, especially, should be reminded that even in a
country as stable as the Czech Republic, the changes in its system in the twentieth
century were dramatic:
         - 1818 End of World War I and disintegration of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire
1918 - 1918 New state established with a pro-Western democratic
government
1938 - 1939 Disintegration of the 1918 state
1939 - 1945 "Coexistence" with Nazi Germany under its Protektorat
1945 - 1948 1918 state re-established with a pro-Soviet democratic-left
government
1945-1960/62 Dictatorship of the Communist PartyWORKING PAPER                                                                           WORKING PAPER                                                                          
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1960/62-
1969
Liberalized, reform-minded Communism
1969 - 1990 Invasion of the Warsaw Pact troops and the consequent
"Normalization"
1990 - 1992 Communism defeated
1992 - Disintegration of the state from 1918 (separation of Czech
and Slovak Republics) and the consequent  restoration of
Western-style capitalism
It is  understood in the Czech Republic that the systemic change launched in 1990
is, institutionally speaking, the most complex task in the history of the country. Our
discussion about IPFs and restructuring should, therefore, take into account the historical
dimension of the problem.
The systemic change in 1990 confronted every citizen and organization in the post-
Communist country with tasks far exceeding whatever is usually discussed in most
papers on the subject.
We should, therefore, keep in mind that whatever may be noted about IPFs (and
other similar issues) is of only a marginal and perhaps even negligible significance.
5.2.2 Internally sponsored restructuring
Another line of argument is much less general and focuses on the already privatized
companies. The thesis is that in the post-Communist countries for at least some years
ahead, the major problem of restructuring will not be "What should be done?".
It is the assumption of this paper that after privatization everybody (every manager
and employee) understands the irrationality of the inherited structures vis a vis the new
circumstances and just as obvious are the measures that must be taken. ("We should
immediately stop production of goods that nobody buys!".)WORKING PAPER                                                                           WORKING PAPER                                                                          
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The actual problem is different: "Who will take the (well-known) measures?" and/or
"What will the punishments be for not taking them?".
It is our view that thus defined, "obvious" restructuring may be achieved even
without sophisticated corporate governance structures, i.e., without an elaborate division
of power in the company and immensely strong external guidance by the new owners.
It has been believed in the Czech Republic that the major post-privatization role of
the new owners rests in "preventing management from looting". If the infamous
"asset-stripping" is taken care of, managerial effort will focus on the obvious, i.e.,
restructuring of the company.
This type of external threat may be established efficiently by the mere existence of
owners and their (expected) long-term interests. However fictional the threat may be, it
has the capacity to provide both the stimulus and the excuse for managers to introduce
elementary ("obvious") financial discipline into the company.
5.2.3 Externally sponsored restructuring
"Obvious" restructuring can be internally sponsored in the sense that it will be the
managers themselves who will carry out the appropriate tasks.
The question is how long this type of restructuring will last before problems reach
the level of sophistication for which elaborate schemes of corporate governance are
needed. It is our thesis that in the Czech Republic the need for governance optimality is
still premature and, therefore, artificial.7
                                      
7 This applies to the transformed companies and need not be the case for newly emerging ("green
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5.2.4 Macroeconomic pressures
It has been stressed already that government concerns about corporate governance
(or, still worse, "optimal ownership") should be viewed as largely irrelevant and
misleading.
Contrary to that, it must be the concern of any government that the "obvious"
restructuring of companies may never proceed if there remains access to subsidies. For
that matter, Czech privatization has as its objective "restructuring the budget constraint"
of the government rather than that of a private or privatized company.
Under macro-pressure, privatized companies easily realize that they are:
• overcapitalized in terms of  property and labor, and
• undercapitalized in terms of cash.
The obvious solution to this disequilibrium is asset-stripping and a consequent
increase in the supply of "production factors". However depressed their prices may be,
time runs out for the seller and he/she is simply forced to sell.
From the buyer’s point of view, of course, the situation is by far more positive
because it supports his/her entry to the industry and/or growth of his/her (profitable)
operations.
5.3 Secondary restructuring of ownership
5.3.1 The initial owner
The objective of privatization should never consist of increasing the efficiency of
individual privatized companies; rather the goal must be the improvement of the economy
as a whole. Given that, a broad based "creative destruction" should be expected from
privatization.
Put alternatively:
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b) the owners emerging directly from privatization ("initial owners") need not (and
most probably will not) be the final--not to mention "optimal"--rescuers of the
ailing companies.
As to (a), it must be understood that:
• not all enterprises will be transformable,
• because it is not within the capacity of the government to make the appropriate
"ranking" of companies, it has to be left to the new owners (initial or
secondary) to differentiate "wheat from chaff", organizing investors for the
"good" enterprises and hopefully close the "bad" ones.
As to (b), governments should create an environment in which secondary
restructuring of the ownership may proceed smoothly and efficiently. The emphasis of a
government should not be on initial shareholders; rather its true objective rests on
optimizing the secondary search for optimal owners.
5.3.2 The secondary owner
The above policy of the Czech government materialized in the liberalism of 1991-92
and through the ease with which securities exchanges could be established, as well as
other markets such as those with production factors and a labor force.
As a result, among the post-privatization processes major importance should be
attached to what we refer to here as a secondary restructuring of ownership. Within this
process the property "primarily issued" by privatization changes hands. Enormous
changes can be observed in the ownership of various business units, blocks of shares,
pieces of land, buildings, machinery, claims, obligations, inventories.WORKING PAPER                                                                           WORKING PAPER                                                                          
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If incapable of resolving the restructuring problem, the initial owner (privatization
participant) must be motivated to sell fast. In some cases, of course, the secondary sale
has always been his/her objective.8
5.3.3 Conclusions
In evaluating the role of IPFs we should be aware that they may no longer be share-
holders in many companies. If this is the case, some other players have taken over the
task of restructuring, while the IPFs have fulfilled their role as intermediaries.
Therefore, the question of whether IPFs represent "competent restructurers" may be
missing the point.
5.4 Spontaneous labor shedding
The success of transformation largely depends on the degree to which a
government is convincing that:
• the hardship imposed by its macro-policy is unavoidable,
• it is everybody’s task to help himself/herself, and opportunities are open to
everybody.
If this policy is efficiently carried out, "rats may leave sinking ships". The policy is, in
itself, a strong enough impulse pushing employees (of all categories, including
managers) to seek alternative positions. The policy is more efficient the earlier the
employees spontaneously leave (well before the company is actually broke).
The instinct of  employees (based on their private knowledge) is the best criterion of
a company's rank. The time and energy a respective government saves on initial owner
optimization can be devoted to removing obstacles for the above-mobility of labor,
namely the bureaucratic constraints for establishing and running new business units.
                                      
8 Some IPFs already before or during privatization rounds of voucher privatization signed option
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5.5 Green-field entrepreneurs
5.5.1 Market vacancies
If there is good news about post-Communism, it is that it created enormous
vacancies in the market. Many goods and especially services have been (and often still
are) in short supply. These can't always be filled by imports in the short run. This
situation makes it somewhat easier to open new businesses and make them profitable.
As a rule, if a need is answered, the profit margin is much higher than that of a stable
Western-style economy.
It is little understood that the microeconomic objective9 of privatization should rests
in making room for all newly emerging entrepreneurs (domestic or foreign).
5.5.2 Two types of businesses
The post-privatization economy should be a battlefield for a competition between
two types of agents, the transformed old structures (i.e., privatized companies) and the
green-field undertakings (e.g., McDonald's and Sony Music).
Given the topic of this paper, and recalling that IPFs have been active mainly in the
realm of the old structures, it may be of interest to give some comparisons of the old and
new. The following table gives some examples:
                                      
9 The macroeconomic objective of Czech-style privatization policy has been already mentioned.WORKING PAPER                                                                           WORKING PAPER                                                                          
               THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT FUNDS                THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT FUNDS
_______________________________________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________________________
________CZECH MANAGEMENT CENTER                                                         ________CZECH MANAGEMENT CENTER                                                        
                                                         page                                                           page 24 24
INDUSTRY OLD NEW
Broadcasting Czech TV NOVA
Dailies MF Dnes Metropolitan
Banking Komercní Banka Bohemia
Securities Prague Stock Exchange RM-System, RTP
Travel
agencies
Cedok Fisher Reisen
Entertainment Supraphon, Panton Bonton
Electronics Tesla Sony
Oil Benzina BP, Shell, OMW
5.5.3 Conclusion
Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this paper to draw any general conclusions
from the above comparisons.
However, even if the role of IPFs were to be responsible owners and even if they
were to fail at this, the impact upon the economy as a whole would not be disastrous as
long as the newly emerging businesses were not limited (or even discriminated against)
in their entries and operations.
5.6 IPFs as holdings
5.6.1 Attacks on IPFs (again)
In summer 1995 the IPFs in the Czech Republic had to repel one more attack
against their role in the economy. It was again proposed that their role in the privatized
companies should be limited, this time by prohibiting them from the boards of privatized
companies.WORKING PAPER                                                                           WORKING PAPER                                                                          
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Even though this attempt was unsuccessful,  the vested interests behind it may be
of interest. More detailed analysis, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
In the context of the above amendment, the discussion about the true nature of IPFs
has been resumed, this time under the label of distinguishing between "managerial" and
"portfolio" IPFs. For some proponents, the former should be granted some authority over
the company in its portfolio and the latter should be, in the spirit of the EU regulations,
restricted in this matter.
5.6.2 Concentration of control
The IPFs fulfilled their role as initial (interim) owners to the utmost. Correspondingly,
their portfolios narrowed. Their new portfolio structure was often on the very edge of
legality (due to the limitations of the Investment Companies and Investment Funds Act)
and often had to be hidden inside a network of "daughter" and "sister" companies.
Despite its own regulation, the Czech government never viewed this concentration
of control as counterproductive and conceived of it  as a process fully in line with the
original intentions of the government's economic transformation strategy.
Unlike the government, two groups of agents often have not accepted the above
approach to concentration. They are:
• managers of the companies under control of IPFs,
• lower-level government bureaucrats.
They have lobbied consistently against IPFs.
5.6.3 Transformation of IPFs
The uncertainty about the nature of IPFs has existed, let us recall, from the very
beginning (September 1991).
As has already been mentioned, there are on-going attacks against IPFs.. These
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• regulating IFP portfolios,
• restricting IFPs from exercising control.
The natural outcome of the tension has been that major IPFs have accepted the role
of investment funds and explicitly declared themselves as holdings. This transformation
means that an IPF becomes a. standard joint-stock company and acts as a financial
group. As such, it loses some tax advantages that it enjoyed as an investment fund but
avoids government regulation.
At the same time, remaining under regulation is the respective management
company (i.e., investment company, using the terminology of the Investment Companies
and Investment Funds Act). If the company wishes to establish a new collective
investment undertaking, it may do so in the future.
5.7 Institutional investor
The differentiation among IPFs is further delineated by establishing cash funds
(closed or open), i.e., agents having no relationship to voucher privatization.10
It is highly probable that these funds, together with the IPFs that did not transform
themselves into holdings, will constitute what will soon represent collective investment
undertakings in the Czech Republic.
This will give rise to institutionalization of investment in the country.
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Evaluation
The role of IPFs is largely assessed as very positive. Their participation in voucher
privatization contributed substantially to the successful transfer of a significant part of
state property (almost 400 billion CzK during the two waves) into the private sphere. The
reasons are that IPFs:
• played an important part in the popularization of the voucher scheme of
privatization because they contributed greatly to the overall acceptance and
popular support of the scheme, and
• became an important factor in the emerging, post-privatization capital market as
active buyers, sellers, and issuers.
6.2 Future role
Misunderstandings occurring throughout the short history of IPFs are now close to
resolution. Some IPFs decided to abandon the camp of regulated (licensed) agents and
transformed themselves into holding-type companies.
The remaining IPFs, together with newly established cash funds, will become
representatives of the emerging collective investment industry. The function of the
industry is distinct from that of a privatization intermediary.WORKING PAPER                                                                           WORKING PAPER                                                                          
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